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ESSAYS

DISCRETIONARY ADJUDICATORY
RULEMAKING: DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING
AND IMMIGRATION LAW
MICHAEL
I.

G.

HEYMAN*

INTRODUCTION

Immigration law has long eluded the norms of American public law.
Whether called a "maverick" or "wild card" of American law' or "just plain
different,", 2 its distinctiveness may be unparalleled in our law. These differences are often discussed in the context of constitutional doctrine, 3 but surely
are not confined to it. Rather, in many respects, immigration law has
developed with an apparent indifference toward conventional legal norms.
Several years ago, in the article JudicialReview of DiscretionaryImmigra-

tion Decisionmaking, I discussed this in the context of the exceptional
deference often afforded decisions from the immigration system. 4 That
article noted the convergence of several factors, including plenary power, as
possible explanations for this deference. 5 Little has changed since then. The
judiciary still grants exceptional deference to the largely discretionary
decisions of the immigration system.6 However, the problems with discretion
* B.A., Temple University; M.A., The University of Wisconsin; J.D., The National Law Center, The
George Washington University; LL.M., New York University School of Law.
1. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformationof ImmigrationLaw, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
2. Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts,
22 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 925 (1995).

3. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990)(providing an extensive, probing
discussion of the manner in which some judges have sought to avoid the hardships wrought by the plenary
power doctrine).
4. Michael G. Heyman, Judicial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1994). I use the term "immigration system" chiefly as shorthand for decisions by
immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. It should be noted, though, that both fall under
the aegis of the Executive Office of Immigration Review and not the INS.
5. Id. at 862.
6. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S.
Immigration Law, Address before the Immigration Law Conference, Boulder, Colorado (May 31, 1996)
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are not limited to deciding how to cabin and review discretionary calls, but
go deeper, revealing more fundamental defects in the administration of our
immigration laws. Not only do we have a problem with judicial review of
particular exercises of discretion, but the rulemaking process itself seems
infected by discretionary excess.
Strangely, this problem with rulemaking is revealed through the vehicle of
a seemingly insignificant case which the Supreme Court has decided to hear,
Elramly v. Immigration and NaturalizationService.7 However, as insignifi-

cant as this case may be, it is remarkable in the sense that it resulted from a
rule produced by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) eighteen years
ago. In In re Marin, the BIA created an adjudicatory rule which effectively
denies relief from deportation to all aliens convicted of "serious drug
offenses."-8 Moreover, virtually any drug offense qualifies as serious, given
the broad interpretation assigned to the term "trafficking."- 9
The problem with the creation of this adjudicatory rule is that the BIA
simply had no authority to take such action. By doing so, it usurped
Congressional authority. It happened because the relevant provision of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)' ° empowers the Attorney General
and her representatives to waive deportability at her discretion, provided that
the alien has satisfied the statutory eligibility requirements." Given the
conversation-stopping nature of the word discretion, it is understandable that
before Marin no one had considered closely the distinction between exercising good judgment in making waiver decisions and constricting that category
of aliens who are eligible for that waiver in the first place. The presence of the
word discretion may give the impression that the BIA has the authority to

(forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with the author)(examining the problems of discretion in
immigration law).
7. 73 F.3d 220 (9th Cir. 1995) cert. granted, 116 S.Ct. 1260 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1996). 1describe the case
as insignificant not because of any callousness toward respondent, but the issues presented make it unclear
why the Court granted certiorari at all. Simply put, Mr. Elramly seems like a very petty criminal, having
served 60 days for a minor drug violation, who was denied relief from deportation because of a stringent
rule regarding drug offenses.
8. 161. & N. Dec. 581, 586 n.4 (B.I.A. 1978).
9. Decisions of the BIA indicate that "drug trafficking" encompasses "any felony punishable under"
the Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Import and Export Act, or the Maritime Drug Enforcement
Act where the maximum term of imprisonment authorized exceeds one year. In re LG., File No. A26 025
339, 1995 WL 582051 (B.I.A. 1995).
10. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-412,66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter INA].
11. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). At the time Elramly was decided by the Board, this
section of the INA provided that:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily
and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of
seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard
to the provisions bf subsection (a) of this section (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C))... The first
sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted of one or more
aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of at least 5
years.
HeinOnline -- 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 84 1996-1997
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make this higher order decision on eligibility in its administration of our
immigration laws. It does not.
II.

THE

BIA AND DISCRETION

The BIA was created in 1940 by the Attorney General, and has no statutory
basis.12 By itself, this does not impugn the Board, but may cast doubt on the
usefulness of making broad, formalistic generalizations of what may or may
not be done by administrative agencies. The term "agency" has simply
become too diffuse to carry any fixed meaning. t3 Nevertheless, the fact
remains that what the Attorney General may do, so may the Board. In
principle, the Board's discretionary authority is as great as that of the
Attorney General. 14 Although the regulations prescribe that Board members
shall "perform the quasi-judicial function of adjudicating cases coming
before [them]," ' 5 it can also "exercise such discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropriate and necessary for
the disposition of the case[s]." 16
My previous piece on discretion focused on problems with the judicial
review of discrete, discretionary decisions. I expressly reserved comment on
how to deal with policymaking. 17 Here, we have an instance of policy created
through adjudication, thus triggering a number of general rules from administrative law.
Unquestionably, the rulemaking function can address problems of general
application, filling in any gaps left by enabling statutes. 8 The legislative
process cannot always reasonably foresee all potential problems. Rulemaking exists as a matter of practical necessity. In support of its position in
Elramly, the INS has stressed the appropriateness of the BIA proceeding
through rulemaking.' 9
12.

See Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review ofAgency Adjudication: A Study of the

Immigration Process,71 IOWA L. REv. 1297, 1307 (1986)(discussing the history of the BIA). See also id.
at 1376 (analyzing the calls for statutory recognition and independence for the BIA).
13. See E. Donald Elliott, Jr., The Dis-IntegrationofAdministrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro, 92
YALE L.J. 1523 (1983).

14. See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954) (stating that "[t]he scope of the
Attorney General's discretion became the yardstick of the Board's. And if the word 'discretion' means
anything in a statutory or administrative grant of power, it means the recipient must exercise his authority
according to his own understanding and conscience.").
15. 8 C.ER. § 3.1(a)(3) (West 1996).
16. See id. at § 3.1(d).
17. Heyman, supra note 4. That article concluded that it was anomalous that courts were most limited
in their review function when agencies had used unlimited discretion. Indeed, it called for the use of
agency standards to guide the use of discretion and thus promote effective judicial review. However, it
expressly noted that "[w]e are not dealing with administrative policymaking, but with adjudication." Id. at
906-07.
18. See id. at 866-71(discussing the problems of the nondelegation doctrine and the current
administrative state).
19. See Petitioner's Brief, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Elramly, 1996 WL 263421, at
*14-15 (U.S.Pet.Brief 1996) (No.95-939)[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. There the Solicitor General
noted that the "Court has recognized that even where an agency's enabling statute expressly requires it to
hold a hearing... the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require
HeinOnline -- 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 85 1996-1997
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Elramly involved a permanent resident who pled guilty to two counts of
selling hashish; worth one-hundred dollars in the aggregate. 20 Elramly had
obtained permanent resident status in 1981, after marrying a U.S. citizen in
1979. Elramly had three children through that marriage, and then divorced in
1990. He remarried in 1991, after the beginning of deportation proceedings.
In February of 1990, the INS charged Elramly with deportability based on his
state-law drug-trafficking offense. 2 ' Elramly conceded the conviction, thus
rendering himself deportable.2 2 Under § 212 (c) of the INA, the BIA agreed
with the Immigration Judge's decision that Elramly did not merit discretionary relief because of the seriousness of his drug conviction.2 3
According to the INS, in its brief to the Supreme Court on this case, the
BIA has simply created a general rule or presumption that aliens convicted of
drug trafficking have a harder road to hoe than others seeking relief from
deportation.2 4 However, what has happened may belie the kinds of legal
chestnuts of which black letter law is comprised. In this case, we do not have
the formal rulemaking that requires notice and comment, but adjudicatory
rulemaking, ostensibly in the exercise of the BIA's discretionary authority.
Yet, if we're to follow conventional administrative law, apparently this action
is legally tantamount to formal rulemaking. That is the government's argument here.25 It denies any legal distinction between those rules created
through the formal rulemaking process, and those produced
through adjudi26
cation, characterizing the distinction as "irrelevant.",
The government points take us through a number of formal propositions
which, though possibly sound as general legal precepts, may not persuade in
this situation. We are told that the Attorney General and the BIA are legally
equivalent, and therefore all entities within an "agency" stand on the same
legal footing so long as legal authority has been delegated. Beyond that,
we're told because an agency may engage in rulemaking, a process which
need not follow any particular formalities, the effect of the BIA's discretionary adjudication has the same force as if the Attorney General herself had

case-by-case considerations." Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United
Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 228 (1991)).
20. Petitioner's Brief, 1996 WL 263421. at *5.
21. INA§ 241 (a)(ll), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(11)(1988).
22. Petitioner's Brief, 1996 WL 263421, at *6.
23. Id.
24. The government argued that "[i]nherent in [the BIA's] discretion is the authority of the [BIA] to
establish general standards that govern the exercise of discretion, as long as these standards are rationally
related to the statutory scheme." Id. at *9 (quoting Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 944 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir.
1991)).
25. In its reply brief, the government argued that the "open-ended discretion afforded the Attorney
General" does not require particularized consideration of the equities in individual cases. Petitioner's
Reply Brief, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Elramly, 1996 WL 435317, at *3 n.l (U.S. Reply
Brief 1996) (No. 95-939).
26. "That the 'rule' in this case was established over the course of BIA adjudications, rather than
through formal rulemaking, is irrelevant. Agency adjudication 'operates as an appropriate mechanism not
only for fact finding, but also for the exercise of delegated lawmaking powers.' " (citation omitted.)
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at *15 n. 6.
HeinOnline -- 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 86 1996-1997
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acted through rulemaking. Perhaps some of this may be true, but we can only
test this pyramid of propositions by looking at the case that began all of this
some eighteen years ago.
III.

IN RE

MARIN

27

Marin involved an appeal from an Immigration Judge's denial of § 212(c)
relief. Marin had pled guilty to selling cocaine, and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year to life. Though he served a total of thirty
months, while he was confined he was served with an Order to Show Cause,
charging him with deportability for his criminal conviction. From this order
he sought, and was denied, § 212(c) relief. The Immigration Judge concluded
that a grant would be inappropriate absent a showing of "unusual" or
"outstanding" equities, a standard not met because of the recency and
severity of Marin's conviction.
Marin appealed the finding, claiming that the judge had used the wrong
standard. Apparently, the "unusual" or "outstanding" equities test had its
origin in another sub-area of immigration law, adjustment of status. Indeed,
the judge in Marin cited to an adjustment case, 28 apparently finding it
analogous despite the difference in the relief sought.2 9
Affirming this apparent misreliance on precedent, the Board in Marin first
noted the general inadvisability of the cross-application of standards between
different areas of relief from deportation. 30 However, it found no error here
because the "general approach... of balancing favorable and unfavorable
factors with the context of the relief sought... may be applied to any case
involving the exercise of discretion."'' 3 Now the Board is getting into
trouble. It asserts that standards from different areas may be imported will, so
long as both areas involve some sort of balancing test. All adjustment of
status cases cannot be analogous to cases involving the deportation of
long-term permanent residents. Longstanding permanent residents simply
command more concern than do those with less of a stake in being here. But
the Board's mistakes get worse.
Conceding that Marin had committed a recent and serious offense, the
Board found the test applied appropriate, although the rest of the opinion set
27. 161. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978).
28. In re Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494 (B.I.A. 1970).
29. In an adjustment case, a non-immigrant seeks permanent residence through a provision of the INA
permitting this action to take place at an INS office, rather than requiring the alien to go through consular
processing at home. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (West 1996). By contrast, 212(c) is only applicable to permanent
residents, and requires seven years of lawful domicile before it's even potentially available. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (West 1996).
30.

See Marn, 161. & N. Dec. at 586.

31. Id. (emphasis supplied). It should be noted that Arai itself conceded that applications for
adjustment must be decided on an individual basis, and that where adverse factors appear "it may be
necessary for the applicant to offset these by a showing of unusual or even outstanding equities." See Arai,
13 1.& N. Dec. at 496. At that, this was dicta, since the Board in Arai didn't require such a showing from
him.
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out the various factors that should ordinarily be weighed in the individualized
use of discretion.32 In and of itself this may seem like nitpicking, for Marin
had committed a serious offense and therefore this opinion, though sloppy,
might seem harmless. But in the course of affirming the Immigration Judge,
the Board established a general rule as a virtual afterthought.
Having found Main a serious wrongdoer, the Board engaged in rulemaking through a footnote, thus setting the stage for the Elramly litigation.
Reading the INA and case law as showing substantial disfavor for drug
offenders, it concluded that "we require a showing of unusual or outstanding
countervailing equities by applicants for discretionary relief who have been
convicted of serious drug offenses, particularly those involving the trafficking or sale of drugs. ' ' 33 Without elaboration, the Board spoke to the future
through the vehicle of a case that at once accented the necessity for
individualized determinations and constructed a barrier of uncertain contours
to those convicted of drug offenses.
As with much sloppy decisionmaking, the potential for future tribunals to
misunderstand Marin was great. And surely it has happened. But, perhaps
more remarkably, the BIA itself has struggled with its intent in Marin. For
example, aside from the oddity of the word "unusual," ' 34 it is unclear just
what would happen were an alien to pass the Marin test, regardless of what
the test really means.
In In re Buscemi 35 the Board attempted to explain that meeting this test
does not lead to an immediate grant, but only serves as a precondition for full
consideration of the waiver application.36 This is odd. Because the drug
offense triggers the more stringent test for a favorable exercise of discretion,
it should be apparent that a showing of unusual or outstanding favorable
equities would negate that factor, thus leading to a favorable decision.
Indeed, in In re Edwards,3 7 the Board wrangled over just this question by
acknowledging that Marin has "caused misperceptions in some quarters." ' 38
The Board is included among those quarters. For in Edwards we have a
sharply divided Board evincing just such misperceptions in a case which
includes several separate opinions, each reflecting a different view of the

32. "Among the factors deemed adverse to a respondent's application have been the nature and
underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations
of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency, and
seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of a respondent's bad character or undesirability
as a permanent resident of this country." See Marin, 16 1.& N. Dec. at 584.
33. Id. at 586, n.4.
34. That is, it is not clear whether such term suggests that the equity must be statistically rare, or that it
must be particularly strong. If it is the second, that problem would seem to be covered by the word
"outstanding."
35. 19 1. & N. Dec. 628 (B.I.A. 1988).
36. "Finally, we observe that an alien who demonstrates unusual or outstanding equities, as required,
merely satisfies the threshold test for having a favorable exercise of discretion considered in his case; such
a showing does not compel that discretion be exercised in his favor." Id. at 634.
37. File No. A-18274740, Deportation Proceedings, 1990 WL 385757 (B.I.A. 1990).
38. Id. (J. Morris, concurring).
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Marin test. What is clear however, is that whatever Marin means, it has
become a de facto bar to relief, a result seemingly at odds with the very
notion of discretion.,
For example, in a recent case in the Sixth Circuit, a panel of that court
asked the INS to provide it with decisions in which relief had been granted.
As the court noted, "[a]lthough more than three thousand of BIA's decisions
have been published, the INS has provided the panel with only a single
decision", 39 in which relief had been granted. This left the court with the
impression that the Board had a policy of simply not granting relief, thus
having engaged in the "unauthorized 40assumption by the INS of a position
properly to be made by the Congress.",
Remarkably, rather than denying this status as a de facto bar, the government in Elramly wholeheartedly endorses it. By its view, "[tihe necessity of
engaging in ad hoc, case-by-case analyses would significantly hamper the
BIA's 1ability to promote a uniform interpretation and application of the
law.",

4

This view represents two extraordinary positions. First, the government
effectively argues against discretion itself, preferring a rule of unyielding
exclusion to one of particularized determinations.
Second, it argues against a more nuanced approach because such an
approach will result in more grants of relief. Assuming that discretion is
applied on a highly individual basis, the government balks at this more
nuanced approach because more people will be found worthy of retention.
Thus, we should endorse a uniform view even though its application will
inevitably prevent the retention of precisely those for whom discretion
should be exercised sensitively in the first place. Obviously, this view
seriously distorts what is meant by discretion and resists the very ameliorative purposes for which discretion exists in this area anyway: the retention of
those whose reasons for remaining here outweigh the wrongs they have
committed.
IV. MISGUIDED DISCRETION TALK

Previously, I called for the creation of standards to guide the use of
discretion,4 2 and at least superficially, seem to be contradicting myself here.
Moreover, the Board appears to have done what agencies, especially in the
post-Chevron4 3 world can do. The Board has filled in the open texture of its
enabling statutes without fear of judicial intervention. That earlier piece
examined the difficulties with the word discretion, noting the variety of
meanings, perhaps conflicting, it seems to bear. Though discretion probably
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

De Gonzalez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 996 F.2d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 1993).
ld.at810.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at * 12.
Heyman, supra note 4, at 906-07.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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exists to assure individualized decisionmaking, the presence of discretion, at
least in immigration law, has led to a stunted judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act 44 provides for judicial review from an abuse of discretion,
but that would seem to lead us in circles in the absence of standards for
determining abuse. The very presence of discretion often reflects the failure
of Congress to generate those standards through legislation.
Fortunately the dilemma of determining what standards Congress intended
to implement does not exist here. Taken as a whole, the INA can be seen as an
embodiment of Congressional intent in this area. The Board in Marin did two
very different things. In creating factors that should be considered by
Immigration Judges in applying § 212(c), it created precisely the standards so
necessary to guide primary adjudicators, such as Immigration Judges. However, by erecting a higher standard for drug offenders, it exceeded its
authority. Myriad invocations of its rulemaking authority cannot obscure
this.
A problem with ordinary, decisionmaking discretion is that it is so
variable, so dependent upon the beliefs and values of the judges before whom
applicants for relief come.4 5 Marin sought, in part at least, to guide judges in
that respect. But the creation of a sub-group of § 212(c) applicants is a very
different matter.
The INA contains a number of forms of relief from deportation, each
dealing with a different group of deportable aliens. And, specific requirements must be met for each form of relief. 46 Of these, § 212(c) is perhaps
most forgiving, for it deals with long-term residents of this country. Thus, it
carefully delineates the forgivable offenses and, importantly, rules out those
who've committed aggravated felonies for which they have served at least
five years of imprisonment. Taken as a whole, the INA is the embodiment of
Congressional values in this area. It set the eligibility requirements for
§ 212(c) relief: discretion begins where eligibility ends.
Surely there is an inexact line between rulemaking and legislation, but this
case squarely falls on the legislative side of that line. Were it clear that
American society condemns all drug offenders equally, perhaps the Board's
action could be seen as an implementation of that shared belief. But the use of
one-hundred dollars of hashish with another seems far different from, for
example, a large scale sale of cocaine. Thus, by effectively constricting that

44. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1996).
45. Writing on the problems of discretion, Professor Carl Schneider defended its presence in
American law, noting that "decisionmakers' discretion is constrained by their socialization and training."
CARL E. SCHNEIDER, DISCRETION AND RULES: A LAWYER'S VIEW, IN THE USES OF DISCRETION 47, 81 (Keith

Hawkins ed. 1992). Though that may sometimes be true of the decisions of Immigration Judges when
applying the standards of § 212(c), it is arguably irrelevant to the BIA in this context of rulemaking.
46. Indeed, the Court has noted that provisions of statutes "should not be read as a series of unrelated
and isolated provisions." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. 115 S.Ct. 1061, 1067 (1995). Certainly this is true
of the INA.
HeinOnline -- 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 90 1996-1997
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group of people for whom this relief is available, the Board has not exercised
any discretion it possesses, but has exceeded its statutory authority. Only the
most tortured application of abstract precepts about rulemaking can possibly
justify this kind of conduct.
V.

RULEMAKING AND LEGAL PROCESS

The government in Elramly stressed the irrelevance of distinguishing
between adjudicatory rulemaking and its formal counterpart, characterizing
adjudication as an "exercise of delegated lawmaking powers.", 4 7 Although
that distinction may count for little in some cases, the distinction is important
here. Formal rulemaking requires an agency to act with a comprehensiveness, discipline and accountability quite obviously missing in this case.
Were the Attorney General to have engaged in rulemaking on the issue of
whether convictions for drug offenses are a de facto bar to discretionary
relief, she would have been forced to consider the effect of such a rule on an
entire class of aliens. She would thus be forced to recognize the differences
within the group. But, because of the retrospective, fact-driven nature of
adjudication, the Board focused more on the merits of the individual case
than on the desirability of creating broad-based policy. 48 And, it should be
recognized that Marin represented the affirmance of an Immigration Judge
who had applied the wrong standard to a § 212(c) case.
The rulemaking process requires an agency to act with "a discipline
49
consistent with predictable, consistent, and impartial agency action.",
Rather than responding, perhaps reflexively, to a particular situation, rulemaking constrains agency power, forcing agencies to adhere more closely to
traditional rule of law values. "As agency flexibility and power is thus
enhanced by ad hoc lawmaking, so may accountability be diminished. An
agency may hide the ball among its various opinions and spread responsibility over the range of officials that produce adjudications." ' 50 This is precisely
what happened in Marin. The Board produced what became an inexorable
rule of denial by affirming an Immigration Judge's novel application of law
through a footnote. Accountability and discipline were clearly at their low ebb.
The case that Marin and its progeny reflect conventional, hornbook law is
hardly made. The process was infected by a decision made by the wrong
entity, in the wrong manner and in the wrong area-an area laden with
critical and controversial value judgments best left to politically accountable

47. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 18, at * 15, n.6.
48. As the hornbook authors wrote, "[b]ecause of its different set of procedures--designed for an
intensive and retrospective examination of the conduct of accused individuals-adjudication is generally
too cumbersome to do a good job of rulemaking." ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. AND WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 102-03 (1993).
49. Id.
at 105.
50. Id. at 106.
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decisionmakers. Quite simply, the due process expected in law creation itself
is absent, 5 ' and what happened harkens back to the ongoing debate about the
nondelegation doctrine.5 2
Elramly requires careful consideration of the process variables of law
making. Not only must we look to the process employed, but also to the very
entity which made this choice, the BIA.5 3 Early in his tenure on the Court,
Justice Stevens made some intriguing suggestions along these lines in
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.54
In Hampton, respondents challenged a Civil Service Commission rule
barring non-citizens from employment in the federal civil service. The case
could have been decided on traditional equal protection grounds, but Stevens
took a different tack.5 5 Noting that the commission "has no responsibility for
foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or
conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies,"- 56 he concluded that its
interests were limited to simple questions of personnel administration.
Whether or not to create a de facto bar to employment by non-citizens was
not the type of legal question that the commision could address.
Stevens concluded that because these aliens had been admitted as a result
of decisions made by Congress and the President "due process requires that
the decision to impose that deprivation of an important liberty be made.., at
a comparable level of government.",5 7 Marin is similar. There was a complex, politically sensitive value choice made by the Board, a quasi-judicial
entity with no statutory pedigree. And, that choice affected the very ability of
51. For a general discussion of what may be termed "due process of lawmaking," see Laurence Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975), in which Professor Tribe talks of the
importance that some decisions be made by entities possessing the requisite democratic legitimacy. Thus,
rather than simply focusing on the substantive content of policies or on the procedural devices through
which they are enforced, Tribe focused on the structures themselves through which policies are formed
and applied. Id.
52. For years, Chief Justice Rehnquist has urged the revival of the nondelegation doctrine. For
example, in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), he stated some
classic arguments against delegation:
As formulated and enforced by this Court, the nondelegation doctrine serves three important
functions. First, and most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental
administration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our
government most responsive to the popular will. Second, the doctrine guarantees that. to the extent
Congress finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an
'intelligible principle' to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion. Third, and derivative of the
second, the doctrine ensures that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated
legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards.
Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)(citations omitted).
53. Thus, even though formal rulemaking would have been preferable to adjudication, perhaps it too
is inappropriate here.
54. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
55. Indeed, this is one of Stevens' first decisions, and it has been suggested that the four other justices
in the majority joined him for that reason. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 402
(1979).
56. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 114.
57. id. at 116.
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Marin to remain in a country to which he had immigrated, one which was his
home. The same is true for Elramly.
Marin teaches two lessons which ultimately dovetail, one structural the
other value laden. First, Congress is particularly well-suited to make this kind
of decision because of its ability to enter into extended dialogue on the issues.
It can hold hearings, hear experts and examine closely the implications of a
proposed amendment, hopefully harmonizing it with the general statute in
question, here the INA. 58 Congress has the competence and resources to
make this decision. In this case, the Board does not.
But the structural benefit goes beyond mere mechanical competence.
Regardless of what view we take of representative government, 59 legislators
are clearly politically accountable. Presumably they mirror the wishes of
their constituents. Therefore, the choices they make about policy issues
reflect public sentiment, rather than the views of a few, isolated administrative law judges. If they do not, then they can and do hear from their
constituencies.
Marin was ultimately a case about public values. In that seminal footnote
establishing the Marin rule, the Board cited to several sections of the INA
and two cases, presumably reflecting the view that our immigration law
disfavors drug offenders even more than it does other criminals, 60 and
applied this sentiment to all drug traffickers. But surely this is the wrong
medium and forum for so important a decision on public values. The Board
correctly recognized that this is a issue of public values, but improperly
joined the issue.
Just as the Civil Service Commission was not competent to create a de
facto bar to employment for non-citizens in Hampton, so too was the Board
incompetent to create a de facto bar to discretionary relief. Discourse on
public values is best conducted in Congress, for it has the competence and

58. Professor Eskridge has stressed the importance of achieving what he calls "horizontal coherence"
in the law:
In my opinion, our aspiration for coherence in the law should concentrate more on the horizontal
coherence of current policies, and less on the vertical coherence of a single policy backwards in
time. Congress itself is the most legitimate institution for achieving greater horizontal coherence.
But given the structural inertia and biases of the legislature, it is those who interpret and implement
statutes-agencies, the executive, courts-that have the primary burden of fostering horizontal
coherence.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium: Peterson v. McLean: InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67, 123 (1988).
Despite Eskridge's concession to inertia, Congress has been very active in the immigration area, and has
indeed set policy here.
59. That is, we've had considerable discussion of models of representative government recently,
examining such models as the trustee theory, the agency theory, and the descriptive theories of
representational structures. See WiLLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 123 (2d ed. 1995).
60. Matter of Marin, 16 1. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978). "Clear distinctions arise in the Act in the
treatment of aliens convicted of drug offenses and those convicted of others crimes." Id. at 586 n.4.
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legitimacy to decide such issues.61 It serves as the "theater of debate about
a system, which view it
which principles the community should adopt as
' 62
process.
due
and
fairness,
justice,
should take of
VI.

CONCLUSION

Elramly is not a Chevron case, for we are not dealing with a permissible
interpretation of an ambiguous statute here; the Board quite obviously made
new law, exercising discretion it plainly lacked. Yet Marin is history, and its
strange process is only now brought to light because of Elramly. This case is
about the proper "theater of debate" about public policy issues, focusing our
concern on the process through which major institutional decisions are made.
Some years ago, Professor Aleinikoff explained the basis for his revulsion
at the notion that aliens, at least those seeking entry, cannot look to the
Constitution for extra-statutory relief.63 Exploring the relationship between
aliens and due process, he concluded that "what we 'owe' persons in terms of
process is better understood as a function of what we are taking from them
(community ties) than our relationship to them (membership in a national
community). ' ' 64
The Marin test effectively denies recognition of those ties. It shunts them
aside, presumably on the basis that all drug traffickers have virtually forfeited
their right to remain here. But due process is not a fixed, static notion. This
case represents a classic violation of Tribe's notion of structural due process
and lawmaking. Our concern is not simply with the decision reached by the
Board, but with the very fact that it acted in this arena at all.
Earlier, I mentioned the government's suspect pyramid of propositions
about administrative law, one it submitted controlled this case. It does not
and cannot. All entities within an agency are not the same in terms of
competence and accountability. Adjudicatory rulemaking is not invariably
the legal equivalent of its formal counterpart. A handful of administrative law

61.

Writing on public values in statutory interpretation, Professor Eskridge said that:

[S]tatutes are more than a series of ad hoe deals.. [but] embody some overall policy rationality.
Policy rationality suggests three related propositions: (1) different provisions of the same statute fit
together in a coherent way and embody a reasonable public policy; (2) the statute is consistent with
other statutes, so that the different statutes fit together coherently; and (3) the statute develops
coherently over time.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1036 (1989).
62. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 211 (1986). There, Dworkin was comparing the rather sterile
notion of the rulebook community with that of the community of principle, one he characterized as a
"genuine associative community" of moral legitimacy. Id. at 214.
63. Commenting on the rights of those seeking entry to the United States, the Court said that
"[wihatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned." Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
64. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Processand 'Community lies': A Response to Martin, 44 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 237, 244 (1983). Indeed, in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982), the Court expressly
recognized that an alien's interest in living and working in this land of freedom is a weighty one, thus
requiring Constitutional recognition.
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judges should not be permitted to forge policy on so tenuous a footing as
exists here. The stakes are simply too high to countenance this process.
Immigration issues have long divided this country, and Congress has been
very active in this area of late.65 These issues are both technically complex
and profoundly political, going to the very notions of how we conduct
ourselves as a polity. Regardless of our political jaundice, Congress is clearly
the theater in which the debate must be joined and resolved.
For immigration law to fare better in the administrative state, we must set
aside formalism, and take a functional look at the process of law creation. My
earlier piece criticized the broad, elusive, almost ineffable nature of discretion in the decisional process. Now, we encounter yet another excess of
discretion: adjudicatory rulemaking. The dangers here may be even greater,
for as the Board takes on the role of a quasi-legislature, it does not merely
seal the fate of individual applicants but forecloses relief for entire categories
of people. That conduct must be recognized and repudiated.
VII.

EPILOGUE

On September 16, 1996, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's
judgment in Elramly, remanding the case for consideration in view of the
recently enacted Antiterrorism Act.6 6 That statute contains a section effectively denying § 212(c) relief to those convicted of crimes.67 Thus, unless the
Ninth Circuit refuses to apply the AEDPA retroactively, Elramly's quest for
relief has ended.
However, despite what we may think about the Court's remand and
regardless of what we may think of recently passed immigration legislation,
Congress is the correct institution to have made this kind of decision on the
conditions for retention of deportable aliens in the United States. But that is
not enough, for it only addresses the disposition of this case. Beyond that, the
problems raised in this Essay still persist. Though the Court has not taken the
lead in addressing them, they must be addressed if we're to bring immigration law out of the shadows and into the mainstream of American law.

65. For example, it recently passed the controversial Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (AEDPA). In addition, scarcely five months after
President Clinton signed the AEDPA, he signed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (IIRIRA).
66. Id. The remand is reported in Wire Dispatches and Staff Reports, Court Backs Out of Deportation
Case, Wash. Times Sept. 17, 1996 at A6.
67. The AEDPA, supra note 65, amends § 212(c) at § 440(d), denying the availability of relief to any
"alien who is deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in section
241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both
predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)." Beyond that, the recently enacted Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 denies relief to those convicted of
aggravated felonies. IIRIRA, supra note 65, at § 304.
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